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In less than seventy pages of unfootnoted text, Professor Black has
produced the most valuable analysis yet of that awesome constitutional
weapon, the power of impeachment. Written with remarkable clarity
and economy, this slender essay illuminates such murky and trouble-
some matters as the proper scope of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"
the procedural and evidentiary rules to be followed in an impeachment
trial, and the propriety of judicial review of a Senate verdict convicting
and removing a President. This is not a partisan work written to at-
tack or defend the incumbent President. It is animated by a passion
of a different sort: a passion for lawfulness. If there is a central theme
it is a deeply felt concern that the well-being of the nation vitally
depends upon the impending impeachment proceedings being "visibly
and faultlessly lawful."' Black's Impeachment advances this goal by
bringing to bear upon these difficult questions a combination of con-
stitutional learning and good common sense.
In addressing the major unsettled issues surrounding the impeach-
ment of a President, Black's arguments seek reasonable and workable
solutions that are compatible with the structure and spirit of the con-
stitutional system. Although such arguments, as he notes, "do not
have the fine savor of ancient learning ... -"2 Black's sensitive analysis
of constitutional structure and values often provides more useful in-
sights than the historical search for the "intent of the Framers" that
characterizes the work of Raoul Berger.3 This is seen in the discussion
of a crucial contemporary issue: the question of the range of impeach-
able conduct embraced by the constitutional phrase, "Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." 4
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1. See C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 69 (1974) [hereinafter cited to page
number only].
2. P. 4.
3. See R. BERCER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973).
4. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 4.
1745
The Yale Law Journal
Counsel for the President and others have advanced the argument
that a President may be impeached only for conduct that would be
subject to criminal indictment, presumably under the United States
Code.5 A historical approach is principally useful in negating this
contention, for it tells us that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" was
a term of art, the traditional charging language of parliamentary im-
peachments;G it thus cautions against the assumption that the words
"Crimes" and "Misdemeanors" are intended to convey their contem-
porary common language meanings. Furthermore, the English and
American precedents contain a number of impeachments based upon
conduct that was clearly not indictable as a crime.7
An interpretation that would confine impeachments to indictable
offenses is especially suspect, moreover, when one considers the rudi-
mentary nature of the early federal criminal code. Notwithstanding
that the impeachment clause explicitly includes "all civil Officers," s
it was not until 1863 that a federal statute made bribery an offense
for all these officials.9 It is no answer to suggest that this inadequacy
could have been remedied by the existence of federal common law
crimes. For if the Framers had been satisfied to leave the scope of
impeachable offenses to case-by-case development in the fashion of the
common law, surely they would not have paled at the thought that
a similar process would continue for impeachment even if the federal
judiciary subsequently renounced the authority to adjudicate common
law crimes for private citizens.' 0 Even under the more comprehensive
federal criminal code that presently exists, conduct that should clearly
warrant impeachment would not be covered." This, in itself, is the
single most telling argument against a construction that would allow
impeachment only for indictable criminal offenses.
Since most of the serious accusations concerning the incumbent
President involve crimes-obstruction of justice, tax fraud, bribery-
5. See J. St. Clair, An Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Presidential Im-
peachment, issued in late February, 1974, at 59-60. The memorandum refers to "the
commission of a crime named in the Constitution [presumably treason and bribery) or
a criminal offense against the laws of the United States." Id. at 59.
6. See R. BERGER, Supra note 3, at 59-63.
7. Id. at 59-78.
8. U.S. CONST. art. If, § 4.
9. See REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HousE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
25 (Comm. Print 1974).
10. Federal common law crimes were in fact eliminated by the Supreme Court in
1812. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
11. Black offers a number of examples ranging from the humorous (hypothetical
President moves to Saudi Arabia so he can have four wives and conducts business from
there by wire, p. 33) to the chilling (hypothetical President uses tax system "con-
sistently and massively" as a means of punishing opponents, p. 38).
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one might ask whether the presence or absence of an indictable crime
limitation on impeachment is of any current importance. Black, in
fact, considers it "somewhat strange" that the question has assumed
such prominence.'12 I believe he thereby undervalues its importance.
Even if a President is accused of conduct which most members of the
society consider "criminal," this issue assumes an important secondary
role. For if impeachment is strictly limited to statutorily enumerated
offenses, all elements of the offense must be fully proven. If not, the
President may be acquitted on a technical defense. For example, under
such a view, the Senate would be obligated to acquit a President even
though clear and convincing evidence showed him to have taken bribes,
if the Senate concluded that he was not "an officer or employee
or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any depart-
ment" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 201(a). 13 Thus, restricting
impeachable offenses to activities violative of a code designed to regu-
late the conduct of private citizens may produce clearly inappropriate
results in a proceeding intended to determine whether the President
should remain in office.
But if the constitutional standard of "high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors" is not constrained by the criminal code, what bounds are there?
Can a President be impeached for ill-conceived policies or for a dread-
ful lack of administrative skills? It is here, in determining how an
impeachable offense actually should be defined, that history is only
of limited usefulness. Professor Berger moves from the fact that most
of the members of the Constitutional Convention were generally aware
of English impeachments to the more dubious suggestion that virtually
any conduct which was the subject of impeachment in England from
1376 to 1787 should constitute grounds for removal of an American
President. Thus, for Berger, the English precedents serve, "broadly
speaking, to delineate the outlines of 'high crimes and misdemean-
ors,' "14 and they are reducible to "intelligible categories" such as
abuse of official power, misapplication of funds, encroachment on or
contempts of Parliament's prerogatives, and corruption s These are
not very precise limits upon a power to depose a President chosen
through the process of a national election.'" And, as Black notes, the
12. P. 34.
13. See Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J. 1111, 1140 (1974).
14. R. BERGR., supra note 3, at 69-70.
15. Id.
16. Berger himself appears to balk at some English precedents. He notes that "[t]oday
impeachment and severe punishment for giving 'bad advice' seems extravagant." Id. at
71. He also suggests that the English practice of impeaching judges for rendering un-
constitutional opinions would, if incorporated in the United States, be inconsistent with
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English cases sometimes seem to prove too much by treating as "'high
Crimes and Misdemeanors' petty acts of maladministration which no
sensible person could think impeachable offenses in a President . ..,,7
In contrast, Black presents arguments of subtlety and elegance that
give meaningful and limited content to the perplexingly vague stand-
ards of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Reviewing the brief collo-
quy in the Constitutional Convention concerning the rejection of "mal-
administration" and the insertion of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors"
as grounds for impeachment, Black concludes that the acts charged
in articles of impeachment should have about them "some flavor of
criminality.""' He then proceeds to find further restraints on the sweep
of impeachment implicit in the Framers' proscription of ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder. Parliamentary bills of attainder, often di-
rected at public officials, made past conduct of the person attainted
criminal, and imposed punishment for it, without judicial trial and
without any necessary reference to the violation of preexisting law.
Prohibition of attainders in the Constitution thus overlaps with the
ban on ex post facto laws. Though the letter of these provisions cannot
apply (the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is itself too vague
to satisfy clear warning standards in ordinary criminal cases), the
Framers' abhorrence of these devices-from which our law has never
wavered-must mean that it would be demonstrably wrong for Con-
gress to act in an impeachment proceeding as though these prohibi-
tions did not exist. The spirit of these clauses can be approximated,
Black contends, by treating as impeachable "those offenses, and only
those, that a reasonable man might anticipate would be thought abu-
sive and wrong, without reference to partisan politics or differences
of opinion on policy."'19
In seeking affirmatively to suggest the scope of impeachable con-
duct, Black applies to the language "Treason, Bribery, and other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors," the rule of construction and common
sense, eiusdem generis: when a general or indefinite term (such as
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors") follows specific words (such as
"Treason" and "Bribery"), the meaning of the general phrase ought
the American doctrine of judicial review. And he reads the comments made in the
various ratifying conventions as precluding resort to impeachment for "petty miscon-
duct." Id. at 90. Nonetheless he apparently accepts Madison's statement at the Virginia
ratification convention that impeachment is permissible "if the President be connected,
in any suspicious manner with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he
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to be limited to the same kind or class of things as that of the specific
words. He does not apply this rule in the simplistic fashion of those
who suggest that because treason and bribery are indictable crimes,
high crimes and misdemeanors can only be indictable offenses. Rather,
Black suggests, one can draw from treason and bribery the common
thread that they are acts "(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which
in some way corrupt or subvert the political and governmental process,
and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a person of honor,
or to a good citizen, regardless of the words on the statute books., 20
It is important to note that the illegality of an act is not wholly ir-
relevant under this schema. The further removed an impeachment
charge is from ordinary criminality, the less comfortable the House or
Senate ought to feel. If this still seems "unbearably abstract" 2' it be-
comes far less so in an important section in which Black applies his
suggested principles to particular problems such as improper campaign
tactics, unauthorized military operations, impoundment of funds, ob-
struction of justice, and income tax fraud.22 It is, in fact, principally
through these discussions of hypothetical but realistic cases that the
reader is able to understand Black's sensitive touch in dealing with
the nuances of impeachable offenses.
Of the many procedural aspects of impeachment explained and
examined in the book, one especially deserves critical discussion: the
question of televising the impeachment proceedings. Believing that
cameras and microphones have no more place in such solemn proceed-
ings than they do in an ordinary criminal trial, Black strenuously
opposes live radio and television coverage of a House impeachment
debate or a Senate trial. Television and radio, he argues, "act upon
what they purport to observe; what one sees and hears is not what
would have occurred if these modern means of communication were
not there."2 3 And such coverage, he fears, would enhance the danger
of a snow of telegrams affecting (or appearing to affect) the result.
While these objections are substantial, they are, in my view, out-
weighed by countervailing considerations. It is unrealistic to assume,
as Black does, that the public will be able satisfactorily to judge the
proceedings by careful consideration of the record and transcript. That
may be enough for history, but the present also has its claims. It is
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convinced that an impeached President was removed only after a dem-
onstration of clear, convincing, and detailed evidence of guilt. Sober
consideration of the record may be possible if one has available daily
transcripts in the New York Times, but those who read only truncated
wire service reports in the Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald may be
left with the impression that something approaching a political coup
has taken place. Moreover, the absence of full, live national television
coverage may itself affect the outcome. Is it not possible that a mem-
ber of the Senate, personally convinced by a careful and detailed pres-
entation of the evidence that the President is guilty of impeachable
offenses, might nonetheless be reluctant to vote for conviction if his
constituents are significantly less aware than he of incriminating evi-
dence? A television spectacle may well be the lesser of evils.
In a thoughtful concluding section, Black notes that certain tribal
cultures know only two ways of dealing with deviant behavior: tolera-
tion and death. A troublemaker is simply endured and endured-and
then set upon with spears. Finer gradations of sanction are unknown
in these societies.
Looking beyond the present impeachment proceedings, Black states:
In the long haul, we must put the spear of impeachment back in
the closet, though coated with cosmoline against rust. There are
infinitely numerous milder ways in which the elephantiasis of the
presidency can be treated.24
Problems such as presidential impoundment of funds, unauthorized
military operations, and the use of the tax system to harass political
opponents can be mitigated in the future if Congress will but use its
vast constitutional powers to enact prophylactic legislation.
This is an extremely valuable book. It deserves to be read by all,
but especially by the men and women who will constitute-if it comes
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